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Abstract
Prediction and causal explanation are fundamentally distinct tasks of data analysis. In
health applications, this difference can be understood in terms of the difference between
prognosis (prediction) and prevention/treatment (causal explanation). Nevertheless,
these two concepts are often conflated in practice. We use the framework of generalized
linear models (GLMs) to illustrate that predictive and causal queries require distinct pro-
cesses for their application and subsequent interpretation of results. In particular, we
identify five primary ways in which GLMs for prediction differ from GLMs for causal in-
ference: (i) the covariates that should be considered for inclusion in (and possibly exclu-
sion from) the model; (ii) how a suitable set of covariates to include in the model is deter-
mined; (iii) which covariates are ultimately selected and what functional form (i.e.
parameterization) they take; (iv) how the model is evaluated; and (v) how the model is
interpreted. We outline some of the potential consequences of failing to acknowledge
and respect these differences, and additionally consider the implications for machine
learning (ML) methods. We then conclude with three recommendations that we hope
will help ensure that both prediction and causal modelling are used appropriately and to
greatest effect in health research.
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Introduction
Prediction and causal explanation are fundamentally dis-
tinct tasks of data analysis.1 A thorough discussion of this
distinction is given by Shmueli,2 yet the analytical implica-
tions are poorly recognised in much of health research,3
for which the distinction can be understood in terms of the
difference between prognosis (prediction) and prevention/
treatment (causal explanation).
Although many of the same techniques (e.g. linear mod-
els) can be applied to both predictive and causal queries,
they require distinct processes for their application and
subsequent interpretation of results. This is perhaps most
easily demonstrated in the context of generalized linear
models (GLMs), but has applicability to other modelling
methodologies, including machine learning (ML). For this
reason, we attempt here to simply and concisely illustrate
the key differences between prediction and causal inference
in the context of GLMs, to outline the potential conse-
quences of failing to acknowledge and respect these differ-
ences, and to provide recommendations that might enable
prediction and causal modelling to be used effectively in
health research.
A brief introduction to GLMs and historical
sources of confusion
Multiple (linear) regression models estimate the expected
value EðÞ of a single variate Y (the ‘dependent’ or ‘out-
come’ variable) from a linear combination of a set of ob-
served covariates X1; . . . ;Xn (the ‘independent’ or
‘explanatory’ variables, or simply ‘predictors’), as in:
E Yð Þ ¼ b^0 þ b^1X1 þ    þ b^nXn
GLMs offer greater flexibility to accommodate a wider
range of outcome distributions by allowing a function of
the outcome [i.e. the ‘link function’ f ð)] to vary linearly
with respect to the covariates, as in:
f ðE Yð ÞÞ ¼ b^0 þ b^1X1 þ    þ b^nXn (1)
The coefficients b^0; b^1; . . . ; b^n for a given GLM are typi-
cally obtained via a statistical process known as ‘maximum
likelihood estimation’, which determines the values that
make the observed data ‘most likely’.4 Although GLMs are
theoretically simple to understand and implement, estimat-
ing their parameters without the aid of a computing device
quickly becomes intractable as the number of covariates
grows.
The emergence of programmable desktop computers in
the 1980s and 1990s therefore facilitated a revolution in
data analytics, since it became possible to perform both
swiftly and automatically the complex matrix inversions
required for generalized linear modelling. However, the
routine application of generalized linear modelling that be-
came established and entrenched was unwittingly predi-
cated on prediction, rather than causal explanation.
Standard GLMs are agnostic to the causal structure of
the data to which they are fitted. The process of fitting a
GLM makes no assumptions about causality, nor does it
enable any conclusions about causality to be drawn with-
out further strong assumptions. Pearl’s work on graphical
causal models [often in the form of directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs)] provides a formal framework for causal inference
using GLMs by explicating the assumptions required to in-
terpret individual coefficients as causal effects.5–7
However, utilization of this framework (and, indeed, rec-
ognition of its existence) has been limited in health
research.8,9
As a result (and despite consistent reminders that ‘corre-
lation does not imply causation’), it remains common prac-
tice to endow the estimated coefficients for individual
covariates with causal meaning, often on the basis of ‘sta-
tistical significance’. This may be done explicitly or implic-
itly, as in a recent (though by no means unique) high-
profile study that found a significant association between
active commuting and lower risk of cardiovascular disease
but then used this as the basis for recommending initiatives
that support active commuting.10
Persistent confusion has also been created by much of
the language used to describe the relationships between a
Key Messages
• The distinct goals of prediction and causal explanation result in distinct modelling processes, but this is underappreci-
ated in current modelling applications in health research (e.g. generalized linear models).
• Modelling methods that are optimized for prediction are not necessarily optimized for causal inference.
• Failure to recognise the distinction between modelling strategies for prediction and causal inference in machine learn-
ing applications risks wasting financial resources and creates confusion in both academic and public discourse.
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dependent variable and its ‘predictors’, which often serves
to conflate correlational relationships with causal ones.
Perhaps the most notorious example of this is the term
‘risk factor’, which has both associational and causal con-
notations across different contexts.3,11
These factors have combined to produce ambiguity
about how GLMs for prediction differ from GLMs for
causal inference, often resulting in the conflation of two
distinct concepts.
GLMs for prediction and causal inference
Models for prediction are concerned with optimally deriv-
ing the likely value (or risk) of an outcome [i.e. Y in equa-
tion (1)] given information from one or more ‘predictors’,
a key task of risk prediction and prognosis. In contrast,
models for causal inference are concerned with optimally
deriving the likely change in an outcome [i.e. b^i for 1 
i  n in equation (1)] due to (potentially hypothetical)
change in a particular covariate (i.e. Xi), a key task of pre-
vention and treatment. Models for prediction and causal
inference are thus fundamentally distinct in terms of their
purpose and utility, and methods optimized for one cannot
be assumed to be optimal for the other.
GLMs for prediction and causal inference differ with re-
spect to the following.
i. The covariates that should be considered for inclusion
in (and possibly exclusion from) the model.
ii. How a suitable set of covariates to include in the
model is determined.
iii. Which covariates are ultimately selected, and what
functional form (i.e. parameterization) they take.
iv. How the model is evaluated.
v. How the model is interpreted.
To illustrate these differences, we use for context a re-
cent study by Pabinger et al.12 published in the Lancet
Haematology that concerns venous thromboembolism
(VTE), a common complication of cancer in which a blood
clot forms in a deep vein and then becomes lodged in the
lungs. We consider how two research questions—one pre-
dictive, one causal—might be addressed using logistic re-
gression (i.e. GLMs with the ‘logit’ link function) in this
context. This is then followed by a more general discussion
regarding the implications these differences have for the
application and interpretation of GLMs in health research,
and subsequent implications for ML.
Prediction modelling
The ultimate utility of a prediction model lies in its ability
to accurately predict the outcome of interest. Such
information may be used to anticipate the outcome—either
to simply prepare for its occurrence or to inform a subse-
quent intervention that attempts to alter it.
In our clinical context, for instance, a prediction model
for VTE in cancer patients could be used to identify indi-
viduals at heightened risk of VTE solely so that they can be
more carefully monitored in hospital, or so that they can
receive treatment with low-molecular-weight heparin13 in
order to reduce the risk that has been predicted.
The prediction research question (RQ1, and that which
is addressed by Pabinger et al.12) can thus be framed as:
Which cancer patients are most (or least) likely to de-
velop VTE?
Which covariates should be considered for
inclusion in the model?
Variables that are hypothesized to be useful ‘predictors’ of
the outcome should be identified; these are variables that
are likely to be associated with the outcome, though not
necessarily directly causally related to it. As an example,
Pabinger et al.12 consider D-dimer concentration as a pos-
sible covariate. D-dimer is a protein that is present in the
blood only after the coagulation system has been activated,
and thus a marker for the existence of a blood clot rather
than a cause of it.
Practical considerations often restrict the set of varia-
bles that are considered. For example, where a specific
dataset has already been chosen, only variables that appear
in this dataset are considered for inclusion. Variables that
are easy to measure and/or record are also preferred, in or-
der to improve the practical utility of the final model.
How are covariates selected for inclusion in the
model, which covariates are ultimately selected
and how are they parameterized?
Methods for narrowing down the set of ‘candidate’ covari-
ates are generally automatic and/or algorithmic in nature
(e.g. best subsets regression, forwards/backwards stepwise
or change-in-estimate procedures14) and operate within a
restricted range of the infinite potential parametric space.
These methods evaluate different possible covariate subsets
and parameterizations according to some specified criteria
in order to arrive at a suitable model. Pabinger et al.12 for
instance, implement the least absolute shrinkage and selec-
tion operator (LASSO15) combined with a backwards se-
lection algorithm to narrow down their twenty ‘candidate’
covariates to just two—tumour site and (log-transformed)
D-dimer concentration.
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The covariates that are ultimately selected are those
that, as a group, are deemed to efficiently maximize the
amount of joint information relative to the outcome.
Selecting the ‘optimal’ subset of covariates typically
involves a trade-off between ‘explaining’ the maximum
amount of variation in the outcome and creating a parsi-
monious model that is likely to fit other similar datasets.
Additional complexity—in the form of more covariates
and more complex parameterizations—is likely to increase
the predictive capabilities of the model, but at the expense
of external validity. This trade-off is made explicit in many
of the criteria used for subset selection, including adjusted
R2 and penalized likelihood-based measures such as
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC).4
How is the model evaluated?
The model is assessed via statistical evaluation of the over-
all model, with little focus on the specific choice of model
covariates and limited reference (if any) to exogenous theo-
retical constructs informed by the context of the model.
Examples of common ‘goodness-of-fit’ criteria include root
mean squared error of residuals, (adjusted) R2 and receiver
operator characteristic (ROC) curves.
Oftentimes, the performance of the model is assessed
using a different dataset than that which was used to build
it, so as to evaluate its wider validity.
How is the model interpreted?
The prediction model provides information about the
expected value (or risk) of an outcome, given data on the
covariates in the model. The model does not provide infor-
mation about how to change the expected value (or risk) of
an outcome. The consequences of any (hypothetical) inter-
vention to change the outcome may be estimated from ex-
ternal knowledge (e.g. clinical trial results for low-
molecular-weight heparin treatment13) but are unknow-
able from the model itself without further strong
assumptions.
The model also cannot indicate which individual predic-
tors are most relevant, as the set of predictors ultimately
selected depends upon the initial set of ‘candidate’ predic-
tors and the parameterizations considered. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that the variables which, as a group,
accurately predict the outcome have any sensible interpre-
tation (causal or otherwise) in isolation. In general, even
attempting to qualitatively or quantitatively rank the ‘con-
tribution’ of different predictors should not be attempted,
since both the magnitude and sign of each predictor are
conditional on the inclusion of all others. Although there
are a small number of cases where ranking predictors could
be useful, it is nevertheless a common problem that authors
seek to interpret individual covariates in ways that are
inappropriate.16
Causal modelling
The goal of causal explanation is to estimate the true
causal association between a particular variable (often re-
ferred to as the ‘exposure’) and the outcome, by removing
all other hypothesized associations that distort that rela-
tionship (henceforth referred to as ‘spurious’ associations).
Such information may then be used to attempt to alter the
outcome by altering the exposure. [We restrict our analysis
here to considering the ‘total’ causal effect, since additional
complexities arise in the estimation of ‘direct’ and ‘indi-
rect’ (i.e. ‘mediated’) causal effects.17]
In the context of a GLM, the causal association of inter-
est is represented by the coefficient of the exposure vari-
able; removing all spurious associations is achieved in
principle by also including as covariates a sufficient set of
variables that ‘control for’ those associations.
Returning to our clinical example, chemotherapy has
been identified as a ‘risk factor’ for VTE.18 However, de-
termining to what degree it increases the risk of VTE com-
pared with other treatments or interventions (e.g. no
chemotherapy) requires a robust estimate of the causal ef-
fect of chemotherapy on VTE risk.
The causal research question (RQ2) can thus be
framed as:
To what degree does chemotherapy increase the risk of
developing VTE?
Which covariates should be considered for
inclusion in the model?
Variables that are hypothesized to create or transmit spuri-
ous associations between the exposure and outcome should
be identified and considered for inclusion in the model.
The most familiar of such associations is confounding,
which arises due to one or more common causes of the ex-
posure and outcome. The causal effect of chemotherapy on
risk of VTE, for example, is likely to be confounded by tu-
mour size, since this is often taken into consideration when
deciding whether to initiate chemotherapy and also likely
affects subsequent VTE risk.
In causal modelling, it is equally as important to iden-
tify variables that should be excluded from consideration.
For example, spurious associations may arise due to an
under-recognised phenomenon known as ‘collider bias’, in
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which ‘controlling for’ a common causal descendent (i.e. a
‘collider’) induces an additional non-causal dependency be-
tween the exposure and outcome.19,20 Variables that trans-
mit part of the causal association of interest should also be
excluded from consideration.
The process of identifying covariates to potentially in-
clude or exclude should not be limited by what is available
in a particular dataset, since spurious associations between
the exposure and outcome do not simply cease to exist if
they are ignored.21,22
How are covariates selected for inclusion in the
model, which covariates are ultimately selected
and how are they parameterized?
The covariates ultimately selected for inclusion in the
model must, as a group:
i. ‘control for’ all spurious associations,
ii. not ‘control for’ any of the causal association, and
iii. not create any additional spurious associations.23
Graphical causal models (often in the form of DAGs)
are of enormous utility to covariate selection in causal
modelling. These models consist of a set of nodes (varia-
bles) connected by a set of arrows (representing hypothe-
sized direct causal effects), where an arrow from one
variable to another implies that a change in the first causes
a change in the second. Any two variables may also be
connected by indirect causal pathways, which are sequen-
ces of edges that flow in the same direction, and paths that
transmit spurious associations (e.g. confounding paths).6,23
A simplified DAG for our example scenario is provided in
Figure 1.
The use of a DAG provides a transparent means of
spelling out the causal assumptions underlying a given sce-
nario. Moreover, the subset(s) of covariates that satisfy the
three conditions identified previously may be identified al-
gorithmically,24 since in a DAG framework the three con-
ditions correspond to covariates that, as a group:
i. block all confounding paths,
ii. do not block any causal paths, and
iii. do not open any ‘colliding’ paths.23
For instance, the DAG in Figure 1 implies that age, sex,
tumour site and tumour size should be included as covari-
ates in order to estimate the total causal effect of chemo-
therapy on VTE risk, since they confound the relationship
of interest; platelet count should be excluded, since it medi-
ates the effect of chemotherapy on VTE risk.
If there exist multiple subsets of covariates that satisfy
the three conditions, practical considerations may be used to
choose between them. For example, subsets containing vari-
ables that are not available in the intended dataset, or that
are otherwise hard to measure accurately, may be rejected.
Once a suitable set of covariates is identified, the goal
of covariate parameterization is to appropriately modify
Figure 1 Directed acyclic graph (DAG) depicting the hypothesized causal relationship between chemotherapy (the ‘exposure’) and venous thrombo-
embolism (VTE, the ‘outcome’); causal pathways are depicted with dashed lines. Age, sex, tumour site and tumour size confound the relationship be-
tween chemotherapy and VTE, and so should be included as covariates in the GLM in order to estimate the total causal effect of chemotherapy on
VTE risk. Platelet count mediates the relationship between chemotherapy and VTE, and so should not be included as a covariate in the GLM in order
to estimate the total causal effect of chemotherapy on VTE risk.
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the exposure–outcome relationship (i.e. remove the spuri-
ous component(s) of their association); failure to ade-
quately ‘control for’ these covariates may result in residual
confounding.25
How is the model evaluated?
A DAG is, by construction, a map of hypothesized statisti-
cal dependencies between variables. Conversely, it implies
certain statistical independencies between variables, the ex-
istence of which can be tested empirically in the dataset
used and then potentially used to further refine the
model.24
Sensitivity analyses may also be employed to estimate
the magnitude of biases arising from unmeasured con-
founding, residual confounding or collider bias.26
How is the model interpreted?
The coefficient for the exposure may be interpreted as an
estimate of the total causal effect of the exposure on the
outcome, i.e. the total expected change in the value of the
outcome that is due to a (potentially hypothetical) change
in the value of the exposure. In our example, this corre-
sponds to the expected increase in the risk of VTE that is
attributable only to initiation of chemotherapy (i.e. all else
‘being equal’27). Of course, the validity of this estimate is
only as good as the validity of the causal assumptions un-
derlying it.
The model does not provide information about the total
expected change in the outcome that is due to changes in
the other model covariates except under extremely restric-
tive circumstances. In general, estimating the effect of a dif-
ferent ‘exposure’ requires a different model. Erroneously
attempting to interpret multiple coefficients in a single
GLM as total causal effects is referred to as the ‘Table 2
fallacy’.28
Implications
The distinct goals of prediction and causal explanation re-
sult in distinct processes for covariate selection and param-
eterization, model evaluation and model interpretation.
For these reasons, GLMs for prediction and causal expla-
nation are not interchangeable and should not be
conflated.
Any coefficient in a GLM could potentially represent a
true causal effect (either direct, total or a subset of the to-
tal), an association due to uncontrolled confounding or
collider bias, or any combination thereof. Interpreting a
particular coefficient as an estimate of the total causal ef-
fect of that covariate on the outcome requires making the
assumption that all other covariates in the model ‘control
for’ all spurious associations, do not ‘control for’ any of
the causal association, and do not create any additional
spurious associations. Causal modelling processes have
these assumptions explicitly built into their foundations,
but prediction modelling processes do not.
The goal of prediction modelling is to develop a useful
tool to forecast an outcome that has yet to occur, and so
the model-building process is ultimately driven by conve-
nience and other practical considerations. It is well-suited
to automated methods for covariate selection and parame-
terization, because the specific subset of covariates that is
ultimately used to predict the outcome (and the way in
which they are parameterized) is relatively unimportant so
long as the model has a sufficient degree of internal and ex-
ternal validity.
In contrast, the causal model-building process is neces-
sarily driven by external and a priori theory, and thus ben-
efits little from algorithmic modelling methodologies. To
estimate the causal effect of one variable on another, one
must specify both the possible causal pathways through
which those effects are realized and the possible non-causal
pathways that transmit spurious associations before any
modelling is undertaken. Although the process of identify-
ing a suitable subset of covariates that remove all spurious
associations between the exposure and outcome may be
automated once all causal assumptions are made explicit
(often in the form of a DAG), identifying the initial set of
variables and specifying the manner in which they are
likely to transmit spurious associations cannot be
automated.
Implications for machine learning
Much of the previous discussion surrounding the applica-
tion and interpretation of GLMs has direct relevance to
ML.
ML refers to the automated, typically algorithmic, de-
tection of meaningful patterns in data, and may thus be
viewed as a branch of artificial intelligence.29 In health re-
search, it is often hailed as the new frontier of data analyt-
ics which, combined with big data, will purportedly
revolutionize delivery of healthcare (e.g. through ‘person-
alized medicine’), provide new and important insights into
disease processes, and ultimately lead to more informed
public health policy and clinical decision-making.30–34
Nevertheless, many ML methods (e.g. neural networks) es-
sentially perform regression, and thus require equally
thoughtful implementation.
Although the application of ML to health research has
potential promise, the distinction between prediction and
causation has been largely overlooked in discussions
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surrounding such promise. Historically, ML methods have
been applied to prediction tasks, and indeed their most
high-profile successes to date involve predictive and/or di-
agnostic tasks.35–37 However, as has been demonstrated in
the preceding example, prediction modelling requires dis-
tinct processes from those required for causal inference. It
is not difficult to imagine that it will soon be as simple to
perform ML methods in off-the-shelf software as it is to
implement GLMs, and that the automation that facilitated
such confusion in the realm of GLMs will be played out on
an even larger scale in the realm of ML.
Selection of a particular variable into a prediction
model does not alone imply anything about the strength
(or even existence) of a true causal relationship between
that variable and the outcome of interest. More generally,
individual ‘predictors’ offer little insight (causal or other-
wise), as prediction models are inherently outcome-
focused. Interestingly, complex ‘black box’ algorithms—
which are frequent subjects of ethical concerns38–41—are
potentially less susceptible to causal (mis)interpretation
than GLMs because they do not attach numeric values to
particular covariates. However, there is unfortunately al-
ready some evidence to suggest that the conflation of pre-
diction and causation has extended into the realm of
ML,42–44 although we have not conducted a systematic re-
view to assess how widespread such behaviour is.
Integration of modern causal inference methods into
ML applications should be sought and encouraged for an-
swering causal questions. Indeed, there is already promis-
ing research being done in this area (e.g.45–49).
Recommendations
Based upon our previous analysis and discussion, we offer
the following three recommendations to ensure that both
prediction and causal modelling be used appropriately and
to greatest effect in health research.
(i) The purpose of any model should be specified
from the outset, and the model built with
appropriate respect for this context
The distinct purposes of prediction and causal inference re-
quire distinct models. It is paramount that the purpose of
any model is established from the outset, and that it is then
constructed, evaluated and interpreted with appropriate re-
spect for this context. All reporting of methods and results
should be consistent with this guidance in order to avoid
misinterpretation or misapplication of the model.
(ii) Contextual knowledge is generally required for
both prediction and causal inference, and this
cannot be automated
The frameworks of both GLMs and ML can provide auto-
mated methods for estimating the parameters that map
inputs (i.e. covariates) to outputs (i.e. outcomes).50 These
methods do not, however, replace contextual knowledge,
which is generally required for both prediction and causal
modelling.
Specifying the initial set of variables to consider for
each model, for instance, requires temporal knowledge. A
model that includes a variable that occurs after any (hypo-
thetical) intervention to alter the outcome is of little use
practically, yet an algorithm by itself cannot make this
determination.
Requirements for contextual knowledge are even
greater for causal modelling, where causal assumptions
must be specified, ideally before any modelling is under-
taken; this is addressed further in point (iii).
(iii) Attributing causal effects requires causal
assumptions
Robust causal evidence from observational data cannot be
obtained in a ‘theory-free’ environment. Attempting to ex-
tract causal meaning from models that have not been built
in an explicit causal framework is futile at best. Whereas it
might be argued that prediction in one setting helps to in-
form intervention in another, such transference of infer-
ence relies on the ability of a single selected ‘predictor’ to
provide causal insight, which it cannot do without addi-
tional strong (causal) assumptions.
Conclusion
The distinction between modelling strategies for prediction
and those for causal inference is not widely appreciated in
the context of GLMs, despite being the mainstay method
for health data analysis. Failing to recognise the distinction
and its implications risks wasting substantial financial
resources and creating confusion both in academic and
public discourse. Moreover, the application of ML and
other modelling methodologies are likely to suffer many of
the same problems (and potentially on a vastly larger scale)
if the lessons of GLMs are not heeded. We hope that this
article has highlighted some of the important considera-
tions associated with the use of GLMs and ML for predic-
tion and causal inference, and thereby provides researchers
with practical guidance for implementing them.
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